I.
The ICJ and delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles 1. Delimiting maritime boundaries is the order of the day at the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court). Maritime delimitation has been a central part of the Court's activity since the 1969 judgment in North Sea Continental Shelf. 1 Since 2000, the ICJ handed down six judgments on the merits in disputes including a maritime delimitation aspect, 2 and at the time of writing there are three maritime delimitation cases pending before the Court. 3 2. Despite the ICJ's extensive delimitation activity, it is only in the two recent judgments between Nicaragua and Colombia that the Court was requested to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm). Nicaragua initiated the first case by unilateral application in 2001, requesting the ICJ inter alia to "determine the course of the single maritime boundary between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia". 4 In the written proceedings, Nicaragua amended its claim and asked the Court to delimit the overlapping continental shelves of the two parties, owing to the fact that the parties' mainland coasts lay more than 400 nm apart and Nicaragua's continental shelf extended beyond 200 nm. 5 established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf". 6 Therefore, the Court did not delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in 2012.
3. The second case was filed by Nicaragua against Colombia in 2013, as a follow-up to the 2012 Judgment. Nicaragua requested the Court to establish " [t] he precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to each of them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012". 7 In other words, Nicaragua requested the Court to establish the maritime boundary beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua's own coast. Although this case is still pending, the Court has already rejected Colombia's preliminary objections in its judgment of 17 March 2016, in which it made two crucial findings. First, it found that the 2012 judgment was not res judicata in respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Second, it held that maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm can be delimited even if the continental shelf's outer limits have not been delineated, as in the case of Nicaragua's continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 8 The dispute is due to proceed to the merits stage. 9 4. The 2012 Nicaragua v. Colombia judgment (Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012) ) raised a number of maritime delimitation issues, which have been exhaustively addressed in the literature. 10 This article deals with a question that such Colombia (2016) ). The discussion focuses on Colombia's fifth preliminary objection concerning the relationship between delimitation and delineation of the continental shelf's outer limits. This article argues that, concerning continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm, the ICJ's 2012 and 2016 decisions are not entirely convincing.
5. Section II briefly sets out the role of overlapping maritime entitlements as a precondition to delimitation, both within and beyond 200 nm. Section III outlines the ICJ's decisions in the 2012 and 2016 judgments. With reference to the 2012 judgment, Section IV discusses whether the submission of information to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS or the Commission) should be considered a precondition to continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm. With respect to the 2016 judgment, Section V analyses whether the CLCS's recommendations on the continental shelf's outer limits should be considered a precondition to continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm. Section VI concludes. This article does not discuss the appropriateness of using the three-stage delimitation process in delimitation beyond 200 nm. 11
II.
Overlapping entitlements as the sine qua non of delimitation 6. There can be no maritime boundary delimitation without neighbouring States having overlapping entitlements over maritime areas adjacent to their coasts. 12 In Black Sea, the ICJ held that "the task of delimitation consists in resolving the overlapping claims by drawing a line of separation of the maritime areas concerned". 13 The ICJ referred to "overlapping claims", not to "overlapping entitlements". According to Evans, this "is not entirely accurate", since "just because a State claims that it has an entitlement does not The coasts of neighbouring States could be either opposite or adjacent.
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Black Sea, above n.2, 89, para.77. mean that it does". 14 However, in Peru v. Chile the Court stated that it would "proceed with the delimitation of the overlapping maritime entitlements of the Parties". 15 In Peru v. Chile the Court showed awareness of the difference between claims and entitlements, rectifying its previous statement in Black Sea. 7. The existence of overlapping entitlements is a precondition for the delimitation of any maritime zone. 16 As the term suggests, maritime entitlements are a function of the basis of title over the maritime zones established under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention). 17 Concerning the maritime zones within 200 nm, the basis of title is considered to be distance from a State's coast. The territorial sea is defined under Article 3 UNCLOS as a function of distance from the coast; 18 the same applies both to the EEZ under Article 57 UNCLOS, 19 Art. 76(1) UNCLOS states that "[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is North Sea Continental Shelf, some doubts persisted concerning the basis of title over the continental shelf within 200 nm. However, the ICJ dispelled such doubts in its 1985 Libya/Malta judgment, by stating that "for juridical and practical reasons, the distance criterion must now apply to the continental shelf as well as to the exclusive economic zone". 21 8. Article 76(1) UNCLOS provides that "[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin". Article 76 entails that if the geomorphological continental margin protrudes into the sea further than 200 nm from the coast, the coastal State is entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm. Accordingly, the basis of title over the continental shelf beyond 200 nm is linked to the existence of a physical continental margin extending beyond 200 nm from the coast. 22 24 Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 103, para.394. As explained in section III below, the ICJ followed suit in subsequent cases. 13. At the outset, the ICJ held that Nicaragua's modification of its initial claim as lodged in the Application instituting proceedings did not render the request for delimitation beyond 200 nm from its coast inadmissible. 33 Although the Court found that this request "is a new claim in relation to the claims presented in the Application and the Memorial", 34 it held that Nicaragua's "claim to an extended continental shelf falls within the dispute between the Parties relating to maritime delimitation and cannot be said to transform the subject-matter of that dispute". 35 Therefore, it stated that Nicaragua's claim for delimitation beyond 200 nm was admissible.
14. Subsequently, the Court discussed whether it could accede to Nicaragua's request to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. According to the Court, "the definition of the continental shelf set out in Article 76, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS forms part of customary international law", 36 in view of the fact that a thick layer of sedimentary rocks covers practically the entire floor of the Bay of Bengal, the Bay presents a unique situation and that this fact had been acknowledged in the course of negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 38 The Court seemed to recognise the exceptional character of the Bangladesh/Myanmar decision, and continued by emphasising that "both parties in the Bay of Bengal case were States parties to UNCLOS and had made full submissions to the [CLCS]". 39 The Court found that:
since Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia's mainland coast, the Court is not in a position to delimit the continental shelf boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia […] . 40 The Court considered that it was necessary for Nicaragua to establish "that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf". Ibid.
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Ibid., 669, para.127.
nm from its coast. However, this could not be achieved by only submitting "preliminary information" to the CLCS. For the Court, the question whether it could delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm depended not only on the existence of overlapping entitlements, but also on the proof that such entitlements existed. Nevertheless, the 2012 judgment left one wondering how entitlement could be definitively established. The 2016 judgment on preliminary objections provided the belated answer to this question.
III.B. The 2016 judgment on preliminary objections
16. Nicaragua made a full submission to the CLCS concerning the delineation of its continental shelf's outer limits on 24 June 2013, three months before filing the second case against Colombia on 16 September 2013. 43 On 14 August 2014, Colombia raised preliminary objections, two of which are relevant to the present discussion. In the third preliminary objection, Colombia argued that the Court had already settled the dispute concerning delimitation beyond 200 nm in 2012, which entailed that the new case initiated by Nicaragua in 2013 was barred by res judicata in accordance with Articles 59-60 of the Court's Statute.
44 Although this preliminary objection did not directly concern delimitation issues, the Court's remarks clarified the reasoning of the 2012 judgment on the dismissal of Nicaragua's request for delimitation beyond 200 nm. In the fifth preliminary objection, Colombia argued that the Court could not delimit the boundary beyond 200 nm because Nicaragua had not obtained a recommendation from the CLCS on the existence of its continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. 45 17. Colombia's third preliminary objection centred on whether matters of delimitation beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua's coast had been "disposed of by the Court finally and definitively" 46 in the 2012 judgment. The Court held that the identity of the parties, object and legal ground of a claim is insufficient for the application of res judicata, since "it is also necessary to ascertain the content of the decision, the finality of which is to be guaranteed". 47 In disposing of this preliminary objection, the Court made five main points. First, "although in its 2012 Judgment [the Court] declared Nicaragua's submission to be admissible, it did so only in response to the objection to admissibility raised by Colombia that this submission was new and changed the subject-matter of the dispute". 48 From the declaration that Nicaragua's claim was not a "new claim", and therefore admissible, it did not follow that "the Court ruled on the merits of the claim relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast". 49 not accede to Nicaragua's request for delimitation beyond 200 nm because Nicaragua itself had not made a submission to the CLCS for the delineation of its continental shelf's outer limits. Second, in deciding whether it could accede to Nicaragua's request for delimitation beyond 200 nm after having declared it admissible, the Court was mainly concerned with issues concerning evidence that Nicaragua had continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Third, the combination of these two elements suggests that the Court would, in assessing whether coastal States have continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm, refer to the evidence presented in a submission to the CLCS. In the 2016 judgment, the Court seemed to have dismissed Colombia's third preliminary objection because in the 2012 judgment it had not settled the merits of Nicaragua's request for delimitation beyond 200 nm owing to the lack of sufficient evidence.
19. In the fifth preliminary objection, Colombia's argued that Nicaragua had failed to prove its entitlement over a continental shelf beyond 200 nm before the Court, as it had not yet obtained a recommendation from the CLCS on delineation. This would have precluded delimitation beyond 200 nm. According to the Court, the 2012 judgment entailed "that Nicaragua had to submit such information [to the CLCS] as a prerequisite for the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles". 54 This 2016 statement clarified the condition that States must satisfy prior to making a request to the Court for delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
20. The Court subsequently discussed whether "a recommendation made by the CLCS, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS, is a prerequisite in order for the Court to be able to entertain the Application filed by Nicaragua in 2013". 55 The ICJ emphasised that:
[t]he procedure before the CLCS relates to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, and hence to the determination of the extent of the sea-bed under national jurisdiction. It is distinct from the delimitation of the continental shelf, which is governed by Article 83 of UNCLOS and effected by agreement between the States concerned, or by recourse to dispute resolution procedures. 56 The Court finally held that "since the delimitation of the continental shelf 54 Ibid., para.105.
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beyond 200 nautical miles can be undertaken independently of a recommendation from the CLCS, the latter is not a prerequisite that needs to be satisfied by a State party to UNCLOS before it can ask the Court to settle a dispute with another State over such a delimitation". 57 Accordingly, the Court rejected Colombia's fifth preliminary objection.
21. However, it did so by 11 votes to five. 58 The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Yusuf, Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja, Bhandari, Robinson and Judge ad hoc Brower took issue with the Court's decision on this point. The dissenting judges emphasised that coastal States have an obligation to submit information to the CLCS in order to obtain a recommendation only if such States prove that they have a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm. 59 Nevertheless, "information submitted to the CLCS pursuant to Article 76(8) of UNCLOS will not necessarily be regarded as sufficient to establish the existence of an extended continental shelf". 60 Therefore, it is the CLCS that decides whether a State has proven its continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm. In the dissenting judges' words, " [t] he function of the CLCS is to examine the submission of the claimant State and to make recommendations to it on whether the description of its delineation meets the criteria laid down in Article 76". 61 The purpose of the CLCS's recommendation is to validate a coastal State's delineation, 62 and a core part of this process is proving that the coastal State has continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Therefore, the dissenting judges found it surprising that the majority should maintain that the submission of information […] The dissenting judges deemed the CLCS's recommendation to be the means through which a coastal State's entitlement beyond 200 nm is established. Until the CLCS has delivered its recommendation, there is no certainty that a coastal State has proved its continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm in accordance with Article 76 UNCLOS. It would thus follow that delimitation beyond 200 nm is contingent upon the CLCS delivering such a recommendation.
IV.
The submission to the CLCS as a precondition to delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles 22. In the 2016 judgment, the Court found that filing a submission with the CLCS is necessary for delimitation beyond 200 nm to be admissible. However, this clarification could be said to contradict the 2012 judgment. In 2012, the Court found Nicaragua's claim for delimitation beyond 200 nm to be admissible, although Nicaragua had not made a submission to the CLCS. The joint dissenting opinion appended to the 2016 judgment criticised the Court for this contradiction. 64 This article does not examine this aspect in detail. The following discussion builds upon the view expressed by the Court in the 2016 judgment. 24. Article 76(10) UNCLOS appears to address the relationship between delimitation and delineation. Under Article 76(10), the provisions of the previous paragraphs on delineation "are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts". Article 9 of Annex II UNCLOS contains a more specific provision, as it provides that "[t]he actions of the [CLCS] shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts". The Bangladesh v. India tribunal interpreted Article 9 to entail, with reference to the CLCS and international tribunals requested to delimit maritime boundaries, that "the mandates of these bodies complement one another". 66 However, Article 9 only conveys that the CLCS's actions concern the delineation of the continental shelf's outer limits, and cannot amount to delimitation, which does not necessarily mean that delimitation and delineation are wholly distinct actions not impacting on each other.
IV.A. The relevant legal provisions
25. 29. The joint dissenting opinion sheds light on this issue by underscoring a point that the 2012 and 2016 judgments did not mention directly. As mentioned above, 74 the dissenting judges wrote that the submission of information to the CLCS is "conditional on the fulfilment of the 'test of appurtenance', as set out in the Guidelines of the CLCS", 75 according to which "a coastal State must first prove that it has a continental shelf entitlement that extends beyond 200 nautical miles before it is permittedindeed, obliged -to delineate the outer limits of the shelf". 76 The dissenting judges seem to share the same view as the Court on this point. Therefore, it seems that what the Court had in mind both in 2012 and in 2016 was that, once a coastal State files a submission with the CLCS, it is confident that it will be able to prove that it has a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm. The joint dissenting opinion could be seen to clarify paragraphs 127-129 of the 2012 judgment. However, it does not clarify the impact of the Court's thinking on the merits of a request for delimitation beyond 200 nm. On one hand, the Court could assess whether a coastal State has satisfied the "test of appurtenance" based on the scientific evidence contained in the submission to the CLCS. On the other hand, the Court could simply accept that a submission to the CLCS, which only States able to satisfy the "test of appurtenance" make, ipso facto proves that a State has a continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm.
30. The latter approach seems overly formalistic. If filing a submission with the CLCS ipso facto proved the existence of continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm, the Court would simply accept a coastal State's assertion that such entitlements exist. However, this approach would hardly encourage the presentation of compelling evidence before the Court relating to the existence of continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Ibid., para.1.4. underscored the "scientific and technical" character of the Commission in Bangladesh/Myanmar. 80 If the Court considered that the presentation of such scientific evidence to the CLCS in the form of a full submission satisfies the requirement to prove a coastal State's entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the mere presentation of such a submission would enable the Court to establish the continental shelf boundary beyond 200 nm. 81 However, under Article 8 of Annex II UNCLOS, the CLCS could reject the conclusions of a coastal State's submission, whether partially or entirely, including with respect to the "test of appurtenance". Therefore, filing a full submission with the CLCS, which would include scientific evidence on how to delineate the continental shelf's outer limits, could not be seen as ipso facto proving a State's entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 82
IV.C. Interpreting the Court's reasoning: assessment by the Court of the evidence
submitted to the CLCS 32. It seems more convincing for the Court to assess whether a coastal State has satisfied the "test of appurtenance" based on the scientific evidence identical to the one submitted to the CLCS. Nevertheless, this approach raises the issue concerning whether the evidence submitted to the ICJ for evaluation to prove entitlement beyond 200 nm should meet the same standard of proof as the evidence submitted to the CLCS for the same purpose. In the proceedings leading to the 2012 judgment, Colombia argued that Nicaragua, by requesting delimitation beyond 200 nm from its coast, "is not only asking the Court to substitute itself for the Commission, it is also requesting the Court to endorse its outer continental shelf claim based on incomplete, unannexed and 'indicative' materials that would never be acceptable to the Commission". 83 For Colombia, a State requesting the ICJ to delimit a 80 Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n.8, 107, para.411.
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This situation would only concern either the case of two States having both filed a CLCS submission, or of only one State having filed a CLCS submission and whose entitlement beyond 200 nm overlaps with another State's entitlement within 200 nm. boundary beyond 200 nm should meet the same burden of proof it would have to satisfy before the CLCS in order to prove its entitlement beyond 200 nm.
33. By holding in 2012 that Nicaragua's request for delimitation beyond 200 nm was inadmissible, the Court seemed to implicitly agree with Colombia. However, in the 2016 judgment the Court asserted that in 2012 it "did not […] consider it necessary to decide the substantive legal standards which Nicaragua had to meet if it was to prove vis-à-vis Colombia that it had an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast". 84 Judge Donoghue elaborated on this question in her separate opinion appended to the 2012 judgment. According to her: [w]hile a full submission to the Commission should not necessarily be required in every case to enable a court or tribunal to delimit a continental shelf beyond 200 miles, information that would satisfy the Commission should normally also be sufficient to serve as a basis for the court or tribunal to delimit a continental shelf […] . 86 According to him, a submission to the CLCS is not always necessary for an international tribunal to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The Court could thus delimit a boundary beyond 200 nm even if it were presented with information less thorough than the information that would be presented to the CLCS. He also added that: the possibility should be left open that, in principle, a court or tribunal may be able and willing to adjudicate on a dispute relating to delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles depending on the information presented to it on the geology and geomorphology of the area in which delimitation is sought. 87 Judge ad hoc Mensah supported his views by reference to Bangladesh/Myanmar. However, Bangladesh/Myanmar, as well as Bangladesh v. India, should be considered exceptional cases, decided on their facts. 88 Therefore, resorting to Bangladesh/Myanmar does not seem wholly convincing. Judge ad hoc Mensah's words entail that an international tribunal requested to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm would be in the position to appreciate whether the evidence submitted to it relating to the existence of overlapping maritime entitlements, even if less thorough than the evidence that would be presented to the CLCS, satisfies the "test of appurtenance". This view would enhance the Court's discretion to the detriment of higher certainty as to the existence of continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. Furthermore, it might also discourage the submission to the Court of compelling evidence relating to the existence of such entitlements. The threshold under which only evidence identical to that presented to the CLCS could satisfy the Court that a coastal State has met the "test of appurtenance", endorsed by Judge Donoghue, appears more appropriate.
35. There is much force in Judge Donoghue's words. Although leaving the door open for the Court to decide whether the evidence submitted by a coastal State satisfies the high evidential threshold on a case-by-case basis, Judge Donoghue would limit the Court's discretion in appreciating whether the evidence submitted to it is sufficient to satisfy the "test of appurtenance". Her views suggest that the Court should meaningfully engage with the appraisal of complex scientific evidence of the same kind as the evidence submitted to the CLCS. In discharging this task, the Court should presumably refer to the CLCS's previous recommendations, in order to adopt the same standard of proof required for demonstrating the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm. Although delineation and delimitation are distinct processes, they both rest on the existence continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm. By using the same standard as the CLCS in assessing the existence of such entitlements, the Court would promote a uniform approach to establishing whether a State is entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
36 37. Moreover, if the ICJ, or other international tribunals, assessed the same evidence submitted by a State to the CLCS, the result would be the implicit rejection of the complementary role that the Commission fulfils in relation to international tribunals, underscored in Bangladesh v. India. 95 International tribunals would in fact pre-empt the outcome of the Commission's recommendation. In addition, using the same standard of proof to evaluate the same evidence for the same purposes carries the risk of conflicting decisions by the Court and the CLCS. This would contradict the complementary functions exercised by the CLCS and international tribunals. 96 38. In order to avoid pre-empting the CLCS's recommendations and conflicting decisions, the ICJ could choose between two options: either the Court stays delimitation proceedings and refers the issue of entitlement to the CLCS for decision; or the Court refuses to delimit a boundary beyond 200 nm lacking a recommendation from the CLCS. Both options would soundly recognise the pre-eminence of the CLCS as a technical and scientific body. Absent an express legal provision allowing for a reference by the ICJ to the CLCS, the latter option appears more viable. 97 Nevertheless, the Court could base a reference procedure to the CLCS under Articles 30, 34 or 50 of its Statute. Under Article 50, the Court may "entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion". However, the Court has been historically reluctant to use its power under Article 50 of the Statute. Moreover, if the CLCS were entrusted with giving an expert opinion on the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm, the CLCS's expert opinion would not be binding on the Court. 99 Nonetheless, an expert opinion would expectedly be given considerable weight by the Court. In Corfu Channel, the Court stated that it "cannot fail to give great weight to the opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information". 100 39. Article 34(2) of the Statute provides that the Court "may request of public international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative". This provision could be the legal basis for the Court to request the CLCS to provide information concerning the existence of entitlements beyond 200 nm. However, Article 34(2) concerns access to the Court, and not information gathering by the Court. 101 One could argue that, by being requested information under Article 34(2), the CLCS would be called upon to act on behalf of the international community. The reference to the CLCS could thus be seen to concern issues of access to the Court. decide, for the purpose of a contentious case or request for advisory opinion, to appoint assessors to sit with it without the right to vote". Assessors are not adjudicators, and they are perceived as fulfilling "the important task of translating, for the adjudicative body, the technicalities of their own scientific domain". 102 Assessors are thus a means to assess scientific and technical evidence. This system would be different from requesting information to the CLCS by means of a reference procedure based on articles 34(2) or 50 of the Court's Statute. However, it could be a powerful instrument enabling the Court to grapple with the complex scientific evidence submitted to the CLCS, at the same time ensuring a degree of consistency between the Court's decision and the CLCS's recommendation on continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm. One could express some reservations on the resort to assessors under Article 30(2) of the ICJ's Statute since, differently from the reports of Court-appointed experts and information received by "public international organizations", assessors would not provide pieces of evidence. Writing extrajudicially, Judge Gaja confirmed that the assessors' opinion "would not be treated as evidence before the Court". 103 Assessors would sit with the Court in deliberation, yet without a right to vote, which entails that the parties would not be able to comment on their views. Therefore, considerations of due process suggest caution in this regard.
V.
The recommendation of the CLCS as a precondition to delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles 41. In the 2016 judgment, the Court rejected the argument that an international tribunal can delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm only if the CLCS has already issued a recommendation ascertaining entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 104 However, this finding raises some controversial issues. the fact that the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm have not been established does not imply that the Tribunal must refrain from determining the existence of entitlement to the continental shelf and delimiting the continental shelf between the parties concerned. 106 The main reason for ITLOS's finding was that continental shelf rights exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of Article 77(3) UNCLOS. 107 43. However, while it is correct to state that continental shelf rights exist ipso facto and ab initio, proving that such rights exist in accordance with the procedure under article 76 UNCLOS is a wholly different matter. 108 The inherency clause does not dispense with the problem of establishing the existence and extent of entitlement beyond 200 nm. With respect to the continental shelf within 200 nm, both existence and extent of entitlement are certain. By contrast, with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm both existence and extent of entitlement are uncertain before the CLCS's recommendation. This recommendation is necessary for the coastal State to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf in accordance with Article 76(8) UNCLOS. The inherent character of continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm entails that the CLCS's recommendations are not constitutive of entitlement. However, it does not also entail that such rights are opposable to the neighbouring States and to the international community as a whole. In order for continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm to be opposable, the CLCS must ascertain entitlement by delivering a recommendation pursuant to Article 76(8) UNCLOS. 109 Therefore, in respect of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm the CLCS not only ascertains a coastal State's pre-existing entitlement, but it also determines whether the extent of entitlement is established by a coastal State in conformity with Article 76 UNCLOS.
V.A. The exceptional character of the
44. In Bangladesh/Myanmar, ITLOS made the right decision for unpersuasive reasons. 110 The Bay of Bengal cases are exceptional, which could in principle justify the decision to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. of the Conference recognised that a different system could be used to delineate the continental shelf's outer limits in the Bay of Bengal and in areas with comparable geological features. 112 45. The scientific evidence produced by Sri Lanka also proved that the States abutting the Bay of Bengal are certainly entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Therefore, with respect to the Bay of Bengal entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm is certain. The only uncertainty concerns the exact location of the continental shelf's outer limit, and thus the extent of the coastal States' continental shelf rights. On these bases, the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in Bangladesh/Myanmar, as well as in Bangladesh v. India, was in principle justified. However, since the Bay of Bengal cases were decided on exceptional circumstances, it is unpersuasive to rely on them to support that continental shelf delimitation beyond 200 nm can be effected in all situations.
46. In Bangladesh/Myanmar, ITLOS held that it "would have been hesitant to proceed with the delimitation of the area beyond 200 nm had it concluded that there was significant uncertainty as to the existence of a continental margin in the area in question". 113 ITLOS found that, in order to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, international tribunals need not be absolutely certain that the States in dispute have maritime entitlements extending beyond 200 nm. ITLOS introduced a "lack of significant uncertainty" threshold, lower than a hypothetical "absolute certainty" one. Owing to the exceptional geology of the Bay of Bengal's seabed and subsoil, ITLOS and the Bangladesh v. India tribunal could nonetheless consider themselves certain that Bangladesh, India and Myanmar were all entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres". See 47. However, the "lack of significant uncertainty" threshold is likely not easily met in other cases in which States claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Whether entitlement beyond 200 nm exists in other cases rests on the CLCS's recommendations, which ascertain that the continental shelf's outer limits would be established by the coastal State in accordance with Article 76 UNCLOS. A recommendation by the CLCS would meet the "lack of significant uncertainty" threshold, and even provide "absolute certainty" concerning the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm. Nicaragua's explicit, and the Court's probable yet not explicit, reliance on the Bay of Bengal cases in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016) seems therefore misplaced.
48. An additional problem is that the Bay of Bengal cases could be seen as generally permitting delimitation in all instances in which both parties fail to disagree on whether entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm exists. In fact, Bangladesh, India and Myanmar had all agreed that they were entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This appears unconvincing, since the agreement of the parties could not be a valid substitute for a clear statement, any factual finding regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf, the "distinct" exercises of delimitation and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf may proceed in parallel, regardless of whether a State has established the outer limits of its continental shelf. 117 By contrast, the case between Nicaragua and Colombia was different, as the available scientific evidence did not unassailably prove that continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 nm existed. Deciding the case between Nicaragua and Colombia "would require the Court to reach conclusions about the same question of fact that the technical experts comprising the Commission would also address after receiving a complete submission from Nicaragua". 118 122 Second, ITLOS noted that the CLCS had decided to defer the consideration of the submissions of both Bangladesh and Myanmar due to the pending dispute between the two States concerning the delimitation of their continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 123 The Tribunal found that "[t]he consequence of these decisions of the Commission is that, if the Tribunal declines to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm under article 83 of the Convention, the issue concerning the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf of each of the Parties under article 76 of the Convention may remain unresolved". 124 ITLOS also emphasised that:
it would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention not to resolve the existing impasse. Inaction in the present case, by the Commission and the Tribunal, two organs created by the Convention to ensure the effective implementation of its provisions, would leave the Parties in a position where they may be unable to benefit fully from their rights over the continental shelf. 125 ITLOS considered itself bound to avoid the impasse that could result from paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS's Rules of Procedure and a potential decision that delimitation could not take place absent delineation. The In his declaration appended to the 2016 judgment, Judge Gaja wrote that "in most instances the delineation of the outer limits should come first, because it 125 Ibid., 102, para.392. Magnússon strongly endorsed ITLOS's decision to uphold the "practical impasse" argument. See Magnússon, above n.26, 476-477. 126 132 provided for an alternative dispute settlement means that, pursuant to Kenya's reservation to the Optional Clause, 133 would take precedence over ICJ proceedings. 134 The Court found that the MOU's object and purpose was "to constitute a no-objection agreement, enabling the CLCS to make recommendations notwithstanding the existence of a dispute between the Parties regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf". 135 The MOU's object and purpose thus was to overcome the obstacle created by paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS's Rules of Procedure. By recognising that the 2009 MOU's object and purpose was to allow the CLCS to delineate the continental shelf's outer limits despite a pending delimitation despite between Kenya and Somalia, the Court could be seen to have implicitly acknowledged the validity of the "practical impasse" argument. CLCS's Rules of Procedure contain a clear provision preventing the Commission from making recommendations in the presence of a "land or maritime dispute" and lacking the consent of the States involved in such a dispute. 136 However, paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS's Rules of Procedure does not seem to necessarily entail that the Commission is prevented from making any recommendation in cases where a land or maritime dispute exists. If a coastal State's submission concerned both disputed areas and undisputed areas, it could be conceivable for the CLCS to only deliver a recommendation with respect to the latter. This solution could find its legal basis in paragraph 3 of Annex I to the CLCS's Rules of Procedure, under which:
V.B.ii. The possibility of partial recommendations from the CLCS
A submission may be made by a coastal State for a portion of its continental shelf in order not to prejudice questions relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States in any other portion or portions of the continental shelf for which a submission may be made later, notwithstanding the provisions regarding the ten-year period established by article 4 of Annex II to the Convention.
This provision allows coastal States to make partial submissions to the CLCS. Similarly, it seems possible for the CLCS to make partial recommendations. These would ascertain, although not fully, the submitting States' entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
55. Partial recommendations could satisfy the "lack of significant uncertainty" threshold formulated by ITLOS in Bangladesh/Myanmar. 137 Although a partial recommendation would not conclusively establish entitlement beyond 200 nm in the area to be delimited, it could do so with respect to the areas falling outside any potential area of overlapping 136 Jensen argued that one "must assume […] that neighbouring States are unlikely in any other circumstances to apply Rule 5 in order to 'block' the Commission from processing submissions". This statement means that in most cases States involved in a "land or maritime dispute" would consent to the CLCS's consideration of a submission for delineation of the continental shelf's outer limits. See Jensen, above n.16, 590. However, it is unclear why one must make such an assumption, especially on account of the fact that it has not been uncommon for States to request the CLCS not to consider a submission due to the existence of a "land or maritime dispute" between them. 137 Section V.A above.
entitlements. Therefore, a partial recommendation could significantly lower the level of uncertainty concerning the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm. If entitlement beyond 200 nm existed in the maritime spaces adjacent to the delimitation area, it could be seen to be likely, from an evidential standpoint, that there would exist maritime entitlements beyond 200 nm also in the delimitation area. In ITLOS's words, the CLCS's partial recommendation could determine a "lack of significant uncertainty" with respect to the existence of entitlement beyond 200 nm.
56. The CLCS has already adopted partial recommendation, for example with respect to Argentina's continental shelf submission. Although a longstanding dispute exists between Argentina and the UK on sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas, Argentina made a submission to the CLCS showing the disputed islands under Argentinian sovereignty. The UK sent a note verbale to the UN Secretary-General, rejecting "those parts of Argentina's submission which claim rights over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas appurtenant to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and requests that the Commission does not examine those parts of the Argentine submission […]". 138 As a result, the Commission "decided that, in accordance with its rules of procedure, it was not in a position to consider and qualify those parts of the submission that are subject to dispute". 139 The CLCS's sub-commission was thus instructed to examine only the areas in which there were no overlapping entitlements generated by the coasts of Argentina and of the Falklands/Malvinas. 140 The CLCS submitted its recommendation to Argentina on 11 March 2016. 141 57. Although the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty dispute does not concern maritime delimitation, at least not directly, it is conceivable that the solution adopted by the CLCS in that instance could also be adopted with respect to delimitation disputes. The delimitation of a maritime boundary need not always concern the entire area in which a State claims sovereign rights over the continental shelf under Part VI UNCLOS. Aware that the CLCS could issue a recommendation partially establishing the existence of maritime entitlements beyond 200 nm, an international tribunal could decline to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm without fearing to incur the "practical impasse" invoked by Nicaragua. After the delivery of a partial recommendation by the CLCS, which could establish "lack of significant uncertainty" as to the existence of entitlements beyond 200 nm, international tribunals could accede to a request for delimitation beyond 200 nm. However, this manner of ensuring "lack of significant uncertainty" concerning the existence of continental shelf entitlement beyond 200 nm seems to be casespecific, as there could be geographical scenarios in which it could provide only limited help. This could be the case of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, in which the areas in dispute between two states and the delimitation area would likely overlap.
V.B.iii. The ultra vires character of paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS's Rules of
Procedure 58. One could also argue that paragraph 5(a) of Annex I to the CLCS's Rules of Procedure is ultra vires, which would deprive the "practical impasse" argument of its legal basis. Jensen wrote that "the Commission has gone beyond the proper limits set out in [UNCLOS] by declining to examine submissions affected by a dispute without the consent of all parties to the dispute". 142 Jensen emphasised that Article 76(8) UNCLOS uses imperative language, requiring that "[t]he Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States". Paragraph 5(a), which gives the CLCS the power to refuse a recommendation, would thus directly contradict Article 76(8) UNCLOS. Jensen's argument is convincing. Apart from the textual reading of Article 76(8), which is Jensen's basis for stating that paragraph 5(a) is ultra vires, there are further reasons to support his view. 59. First, other UNCLOS provisions including the term "shall" have been read as being imperative in character. For example, Article 290(6) UNCLOS provides that the parties to a dispute under Part XV of the Convention "shall comply promptly with any provisional measures prescribed under this article". ITLOS interpreted Article 290(6) as endowing provisional measures prescribed under it with binding character. 143 Similarly, Rosenne described guidance regarding the Commission's dealing with areas which were the subject of disputes or with undefined boundaries between opposite or adjacent States".
147 Therefore, the CLCS adopted Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, and paragraph 5(a) therein, following a request from the States parties to UNCLOS. However, the CLCS refrained from adopting Annex I until such time as it would have been "considered" by the Meeting of the States parties to the Convention. 148 Upon considering Annex I, States remarked that "the Rules of Procedure should be drafted in a neutral manner and should be limited to what the Commission can or cannot do, and should not appear to create new rights for States that are only defined by the Convention".
149 Such a statement was not opposed by any State. However, paragraph 5(a) could be said to create a right to veto the consideration of a submission by the CLCS. The holder of such a right would be every State with which another State making a submission to the CLCS has an on-going "land or maritime dispute". Paragraph 5(a) could thus be said to endow States with rights not provided for under UNCLOS. As a result, it seems to be ultra vires and to have been adopted against the explicit indications of the States parties to UNCLOS. This could be problematic for the persuasiveness of the "practical impasse" argument.
submission at the time of their delimitation dispute. A 2009 Statement by the CLCS Chairperson on Myanmar's submission reported that "the Commission decided to defer further consideration of the submission and the notes verbales until such time as the submission is next in line for consideration as queued in the order in which it was received". 150 With reference to Bangladesh's submission, a 2011 Statement by the CLCS's Chairperson stated that "the Commission decided to defer further consideration of the submission and the notes until such time as the submission was next in line for consideration as queued in the order in which it was received". 151 The CLCS's Chairperson used similar wording with respect to India's submission in a 2010 Statement. 152 63. The CLCS's decision in respect of the submissions of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar does not convey that the Commission decided to "defer" their consideration exclusively owing to the existence of delimitation disputes involving those States. The wording used in the Chairperson's Statements conveyed that the submissions would not be considered immediately, but only after all other submissions filed before the ones of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar would have been considered. The CLCS's decisions were thus not actual "deferrals". A "deferral" implies that the submission is ready for consideration, yet it would be considered at a later stage. Conversely, the CLCS simply implemented a chronological criterion under which all submissions would be considered in the order in which they were filed. It follows that one does not know how the CLCS would deal with a coastal State's submission if, that submission being ready for consideration given the chronological order in which it was filed, a germane delimitation case were still subject to dispute settlement by any means.
64. With respect to the Bay of Bengal cases, the CLCS presumably expected that, by the time the submission would have needed to be considered in accordance with the chronological criterion, ITLOS and the Bangladesh v. India tribunal would have settled the disputes involving Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Therefore, by that time international tribunals would have decided whether they could delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm prior to its delineation. The Commission would thus have avoided addressing the legal matter concerning the relationship between delimitation and delineation. The CLCS itself may have deemed the consideration of legal issues to be beyond its expertise as a technical and scientific body.
65. This situation repeated itself in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2016) . With respect to Nicaragua's submission, the Commission's Chairperson wrote, in a 2014 Statement, that:
[a]ddressing the modalities for the consideration of the submission, the Commission took note of the communications from Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama; and the joint communications from Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama.
[…] The Commission also took note of the views expressed in the presentation by Nicaragua in connection with the communications. Taking into account these communications and the presentation made by the delegation, the Commission decided to defer further consideration of the submission and the communications until such time as the submission was next in line for consideration, as queued in the order in which it was received. 153 The wording is the same as that previously employed in relation to the submissions of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Therefore, the same considerations apply. The CLCS did not make an actual deferral, but simply scheduled the consideration of Nicaragua's submission according to the chronological order in which it had been filed.
66. Although it did not explicitly discuss the "practical impasse" argument in its 2016 judgment, the Court reached a solution in accordance with it. According to the Court, international tribunals requested to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm need not wait for the CLCS's recommendation on the delineation of that continental shelf's outer limits. However, the "practical impasse" argument, prima facie convincing, raises a number of problems. These problems could cast doubts on the Court's decision, in the 2016 judgment, that delimitation beyond 200 nm could be effected absent the CLCS's recommendation. 68. The statement that delimitation and delineation are distinct and thus could be carried out independently of one another raises contentious issues. First, the decisions in Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh v. India, to date the only cases in which continental shelf delimitation was effected beyond 200 nm, could not be taken as authoritative statements that delimitation and delineation could be performed independently, owing to their exceptional character. Second, Nicaragua's "practical impasse" argument, not explicitly endorsed but conceivably considered by the Court in its judgments, seems unconvincing. Delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm prior to the CLCS's recommendation conclusively ascertaining entitlement could be seen to have a positive effect, as it would permit the full settlement of inter-State disputes concerning maritime delimitation. However, in most cases it would seem more appropriate for international tribunals to establish boundaries beyond 200 nm only after the CLCS's recommendation ascertaining that entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm actually exists.
